The Forgotten Constitutional Moment. by McConnell, Michael W.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary
1994
The Forgotten Constitutional Moment.
Michael W. McConnell
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
McConnell, Michael W., "The Forgotten Constitutional Moment." (1994). Constitutional Commentary. 749.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/749
THE FORGOTTEN CONSTITUTIONAL 
MOMENT 
Michael W. McConnell* 
Theory and history have an uncomfortable relation. Some-
times theory derives from history, as an attempt to explain and 
reconcile events that have taken place. And sometimes history 
trips up theory, when events stubbornly refuse to conform to the 
theory we have laid out. 
One currently popular constitutional theory, the theory of 
"constitutional moments" championed by Yale Professor Bruce 
Ackerman, purports to be derived from history. The present 
state of orthodox constitutional theory, Ackerman says, is "pecu-
liarly ahistorical," which has produced "a remarkable breach be-
tween constitutional theory and constitutional practice."t Our 
constitutional order, he says, "is best rediscovered by reflecting 
on the course of its historical development over the past two cen-
turies."z Ackerman's history reveals that the real Constitution is 
not truly, or not solely, the text we call the "Constitution," nor is 
it whatever five Justices of the Supreme Court think it is. The 
real Constitution is a set of principles adopted by "We, the Peo-
ple" at extraordinary "moments" of intense constitutional partic-
ipation and deliberation, with or without changes in the 
constitutional text. These "moments" result in constitutional 
transformations that are and should be honored by the courts 
and other political actors no less than amendments adopted pur-
suant to Article V. 
This, according to devotees of the theory, has happened 
three times in American history: in 1787, when the Federalists 
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1. Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 3, 5 (Belknap Press, 1991) ("We 
the People"). 
2. Id. at 5. 
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obtained popular approval of the Constitution in violation of the 
procedures specified in the Articles of Confederation; during Re-
construction, when the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments 
were declared to be ratified without the genuine approval of 
three fourths of the states; and during the New Deal, when Presi-
dent Franklin Roosevelt and a compliant Congress cast aside the 
shackles of limited government through a combination of popu-
lar opinion and the Court packing plan.3 
The theory can be maintained, however, only by ignoring 
the fact that for almost eighty years of our history, from 1877 
until 1954 (if not longer), the constitutional principles actually 
put into practice had nothing to do with any of the constitutional 
moments recognized by the theory, but were in direct repudia-
tion of the principles of the Reconstruction Amendments. This 
article is about the end of Reconstruction, the forgotten constitu-
tional moment, and its implications for the constitutional mo-
ment theory itself. The first section discusses constitutional 
moment theory in greater detail; the second section shows why 
the end of Reconstruction must be understood as a constitutional 
moment under the theory; and the third section discusses the im-
plications of these conclusions. 
I. THE THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS 
Constitutional moments theory presents itself as democratic, 
positivist, and historical, rather than foundationalist, realist, or 
critical. It rejects the idea that constitutional law is mere political 
decisionmaking by the judiciary, for it affirms that judges have an 
obligation to give legal force to objectively ascertainable consti-
tutional principles that were adopted by the People.4 It denies 
that law is predicated on inherent principles of human rights or 
natural justice rather than on the will of the governed. The job of 
the judge is to preserve principles adopted (by others) in the past, 
not to nudge the system in a direction that the judge thinks 
would be desirable for the future. The theory thus bears a strong 
resemblance to originalism, but with two significant differences. 
First, rather than interpreting the constituent parts of the 
Constitution in accordance with their original purpose and un-
derstanding, the constitutional moment theorists understand con-
stitutional interpretation to require "intergenerational 
synthesis." This means that later amendments (whether textual 
3. This is a rough summary of the theory as presented in Ackerman, We the People 
(cited in note 1 ). 
4. Id. at 60-61. 
1994] FORGOTTEN CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENT 117 
or nontextual) subtly modify earlier provisions even if those ear-
lier provisions were not explicitly amended. This process of syn-
thesis, moreover, is conducted at an extremely high level of 
generality, allowing judges a large number of legitimate interpre-
tive options. Thus, for example, Griswold v. Connecticuf5 is ex-
plained as a synthesis of the Founders' concern with individual 
liberty, as modified by the New Deal's affirmation of activist gov-
ernment in the economic sphere.6 This requires the interpreter 
to generalize from the Bill of Rights to a general libertarianism, 
and then to particularize from New Deal government "activism" 
to activism in the economic sphere-producing a regime of liber-
tarianism in non-economic matters. But as Ackerman acknowl-
edges, it would be equally possible to particularize the Founding 
(treating the Bill of Rights as a list of relatively specific protec-
tions) and to generalize the New Deal (treating it as an affirma-
tion of the broad powers of democratic government), thus 
producing the dissenting opinion in Griswold. At . this level of 
abstraction, everything depends on which elements in the three 
constitutional regimes the judge decides to expand or emphasize, 
and which to contract or subordinate.? 
Second, the constitutional moment theory disputes what had 
been the least controversial aspect of originalist (or any other 
traditional) interpretation: the priority of the text. According to 
the constitutional moment theory, the Constitution can be 
amended (and was amended, during the New Deal) without any 
actual changes to the text. This makes it difficult to know pre-
cisely what changes in the constitutional regime have been made. 
It is a nice intellectual exercise to imagine what constitutional 
amendment(s) the New Dealers would have made if the New 
Dealers had made a constitutional amendment (an end to dual 
federalism? additional federal powers over economic affairs? ex-
panded presidential authority? abolition of substantive due pro-
cess?). This compounds the problem of abstraction already 
noted. 
None of this matters much for the first two recognized con-
stitutional moments. Whatever their procedural irregularities, 
both resulted in actual changes to the constitutional text, and the 
problem of synthesis is minimized by the fact that the original 
5. 381 u.s. 479 (1%5). 
6. Ackerman, We the People at 150-58 (cited in note 1). 
7. In my view, there is nothing inherently inconsistent between originalism and the 
idea of intergenerational synthesis, but the high level of generality and the tendency to 
assume unintended changes in unamended parts of the text are nonoriginalist in their 
orientation. 
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Constitution dealt primarily with the subject of the national gov-
ernment while the Fourteenth Amendment is primarily ad-
dressed to the states.s The practical significance of the theory 
lies in its treatment of the New Deal as an unwritten amendment 
to the Constitution. According to the theory, the Old Court was 
in a sense correct to find the new centralized welfare-regulatory 
state of the New Deal inconsistent with the principles of the Con-
stitution, but in the ensuing struggle between the Court and the 
political branches, "We the People" were mobilized, and 
"amended" the Constitution (though not the constitutional text) 
to reject laissez-faire and embrace a new, more activist, vision of 
government. Thus what had been unconstitutional before be-
came part of the constitutional fabric. 
This challenges the conventional view of New Deal constitu-
tionalism, which rested not on an asserted amendment of the 
Constitution, but on a return to what Justice Hugo Black-a 
quintessential New Dealer-said was "the original constitutional 
proposition that courts do not substitute their social and eco-
nomic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are 
elected to pass laws."9 Far from constituting a "revolution"-or 
even a constitutional "amendment"-Robert Jackson, 
Roosevelt's Solicitor General from 1933 to 1939, described New 
Deal constitutionalism as a correction of past mistakes and a re-
turn "to the original sweep and vigor of those clauses which con-
fer power on the Federal Government," as well as to "tolerable 
approximations" of the "original meaning" of the clauses that 
limit governmental power.w It was "a struggle against judicial 
excess" and for a return to "judicial restraint."n No longer 
would the Supreme Court "deny important powers to both state 
and nation on principles nowhere found in the Constitution 
itself. "12 
8. Probably the most interesting problems of intergenerational synthesis posed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment have to do with the incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Do 
some of the principles of the Bill of Rights attain a different meaning when applied to 
state and local government? See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural 
Free Exercise, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 477, 491-92 (1991) (arguing that the Supreme Court failed 
to recognize the difficulties involved in applying the Religion Clauses of the First Amend-
ment to the states). 
9. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963). 
10. Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy xv (Alfred A. Knopf, 
1941). 
11. Id. at vii. 
12. Id. at viii-ix. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (per 
Douglas, J.) (summarizing leading New Deal cases as holding that "[w]e do not sit as a 
super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch eco-
nomic problems, business affairs, or social conditions."); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 
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Constitutional moment theorists, by contrast, tell us that the 
substance of the Constitution was transformed-not just that 
mistaken interpretations were corrected or that the balance of 
power between legislative and judicial branches was righted. In-
deed, they deny the centrality of judicial restraint to New Deal 
constitutionalism.13 This enables them to claim the heritage of 
the Lochner era as precedent to support the judicial activism of 
the recent past-in service, of course, of a new set of constitu-
tional principles. Professor Ackerman observes that a "dismis-
sive view" of the Lochner period is "unfortunate," for it was only 
during this period that "the Court beg[ a ]n to review the constitu-
tionality of national legislation on a regular basis" and dramati-
cally increased "the scope and intensity of its scrutiny of state 
legislation." Let us not "cut ourselves off from such a potentially 
rewarding source of insight."!14 
This debate over the historical grounding of New Deal con-
stitutionalism is not mere antiquarianism, but bears closely on 
the debates over constitutional theory today.1s The "judicial re-
straint" interpretation of New Deal constitutionalism does noth-
ing to legitimate the recrudescence of judicial activism in the 
Warren and Burger periods. It emphasizes the essential similar-
ity between Lochner and Griswold; it suggests that the William 
Rehnquists and Robert Borks of today are the jurisprudential 
heirs of Robert Jackson and Hugo Black. Constitutional mo-
ment theory, in contrast, by emphasizing political substance 
rather than institutional competence, traces the lineage from 
Jackson and Black to William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall. 
300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) ("Even if the wisdom of the policy be regarded as debatable and 
its effects uncertain, still the legislature is entitled to its judgment"); Nebbia v. New York, 
291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) ("So far as the requirement of due process is concerned ... a 
state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote 
public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts 
are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legisla-
ture, to override it."). 
13. This view of the New Deal is not peculiar to constitutional moment theorists. 
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Panial Constitution 40-67 (Harv. U. Press, 1993). While 
he does not subscribe to the theory of nontextual constitutional "amendments," Sunstein 
supports Ackerman's general understanding of New Deal constitutionalism: "[T]he 
revolution of 1937 should be seen, not principally as an endorsement of 'judicial restraint,' 
... but instead as a dramatic shift in the prevailing notions of neutrality and action." Id. 
at 42. Significantly, Sunstein recognizes that the "conventional" understanding of the 
New Deal's repudiation of Lochner "lay in the Court's readiness to interfere with democ-
racy." ld. at 66. 
14. Ackerman, We the People at 63 (cited in note 1). 
15. This is best seen not in We the People, which is primarily historical in orientation, 
but in Cass Sunstein 's Partial Constitution (cited in note 13), which relates the revisionist 
understanding of New Deal constitutionalism to a wide array of current doctrinal 
controversies. 
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It declares the political principles of the New Deal constitution-
ally entrenched, even though they are nowhere mentioned in the 
constitutional text, while still proclaiming fidelity to a constitu-
tional order in which the only constitutional principles legiti-
mately enforceable by the courts are those adopted by the 
People. The theory thus delegitimates those (like Ronald Rea-
gan or Robert Bork) who are unreconciled to the New Deal con-
stitutional moment and propose to depart from it without first 
obtaining a constitutional moment for their own position. 
What is more, constitutional moment theory not only en-
trenches the political victories of the New Deal but lays the 
groundwork for extension and elaboration of those political prin-
ciples in the future. Not limited by any formulation of constitu-
tional principles that was written down at the time of the New 
Deal constitutional moment, the carriers of the torch in our gen-
eration are able to reformulate the constitutional principles of 
the New Deal in light of the issues of the day, without the con-
straints that come from constitutional text. 
There are many problems with the theory, which other com-
mentators have duly noted.t6 But perhaps the most serious is 
that there are no generally accepted criteria for describing a con-
stitutional moment. Textualist constitutionalism has no such 
problem, because we can usually tell when the constitutional text 
has been amended.17 "Common law" constitutionalism similarly 
has no such problem, because no constitutional principle is ever 
truly entrenched. But if constitutional moments occur without 
any alteration in the constitutional text, and still must be given 
the force of law even by judges who disagree with them, we need 
objective and generally accepted rules of recognition for consti-
tutional moments. 
Professor Ackerman is acutely aware of this necessity. He 
produced his theory in the shadow of a potential claim by Rea-
16. See, e.g., William W. Fisher III, The Defects of Dualism, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 955 
(1992) (Book Review); Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A 
Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 759 
(1992); Terrance Sandalow, Abstract Democracy: A Review of Ackerman's We The Peo-
ple, 9 Const. Comm. 309 (1992); Frederick Schauer, Deliberating About Deliberation, 90 
Mich. L. Rev. 1187 (1992) (Book Review); Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 
105 Harv. L. Rev. 918 (1992). 
17. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional 
Lessons of the Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 Yale L.J. 677 (1993); but see Sanford Lev-
inson, Accounting for Constitutional Change (Or, How Many Times Has the United States 
Constitution Been Amended? (A) <26; (B) 26; (C) >26; (D) All of the Above), 8 Const. 
Comm. 409 (1991). 
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gan Republicans to constitutional momenthood.ls Thus, Acker-
man propounds four stages that must occur if a political change is 
to be understood as a constitutional moment. First, proponents 
of the change must "signal" that they have the broad, deep, and 
decisive support of the American people for constitutional trans-
formation. Second, the political leaders of the movement must 
elaborate their transformative agenda into relatively concrete 
"proposals" that the people can accept or reject. Third, there 
must be a "substantial period for mobilized deliberation" by the 
people, typically triggered by conflict between two or more of the 
branches of government, during which the proponents of change 
gain the deep and sustained support of the majority of the Peo-
ple. Fourth, after one or another position triumphs in the polit-
ical arena, the courts must "translate" or "codify" this political 
success into "cogent doctrinal principles" that will govern consti-
tutional law into the future.19 
These criteria are said to include the New Deal and to ex-
clude the Reagan era as constitutional moments. Whether they 
accomplish this purpose is debatable.zo My intention here, how-
ever, is to accept those criteria and to demonstrate that they en-
compass a constitutional moment that most of us would rather 
not recognize: the end of Reconstruction. This constitutional 
moment began with the congressional deliberations over the 
Civil Rights Act of 1875, took effect with the Compromise of 
1877, was codified in a series of decisions culminating in Plessy v. 
Ferguson,zt and endured until well after the Second World War. 
If Ackerman is correct about constitutional moments, he is incor-
rect about something much more important. There have been 
not three constitutional regimes in American history, but four. 
Ackerman's "middle republic," defined by allegiance to the Re-
construction Amendments, lasted less than a decade. It was suc-
ceeded by the Jim Crow Republic. Those who remain tied to a 
theory of constitutional law based on the text of the Constitution 
may have no difficulty in proclaiming Jim Crow illegitimate. But 
18. Reagan's "failed constitutional moment" is discussed repeatedly in the book, 
giving the impression that the specter of Reagan has much to do with the design of the 
theory. Ackerman, We the People at 50-51, 52, 56, 112-13, 162, 268-69, 278 (cited in note 
1). 
19. Id. at 48-49, 266-68, 272-90. A summary may be found at page 290. 
20. William Fisher, for example, contends that under Ackerman's criteria, the con-
stitutional reforms attempted by Presidents Reagan and Bush seem to qualify, while 
Michael Klarman questions whether the constitutional moments of 1866 and 1936 pass 
muster. Fisher, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 975-76 (cited in note 16); Klarman, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 
at 769 n.63, 770-71 (cited in note 16). 
21. 163 u.s. 537 (1896). 
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under the theory of constitutional moments it was no less legiti-
mate-and deserves no less constitutional respect-than the 
New Deal. 
II. THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION AS A 
CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENT 
Professor Ackerman mentions a number of near-miss consti-
tutional moments, from the defeat of William Jennings Bryan's 
populist crusade to the decline of Reaganism. But he makes only 
one passing reference to 1877-and even then treats "the consti-
tutional crisis generated by the Hayes-Tilden election of 1876" as 
significant only for whether the "principal forum for the normal 
politics of the middle republic would be Congress [or] the Presi-
dency."22 He does not mention that the events surrounding the 
Hayes-Tilden election marked the nullification of the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments and the end of the "middle repub-
lic." Yet the end of Reconstruction precisely fits Ackerman's 
model of a constitutional moment, meeting all four of his criteria. 
It should not be forgotten or overlooked. 
A. SIGNALING 
By 1876, opponents of Reconstruction had clearly "sig-
nalled" their intent to challenge the previous consensus. The 
earlier consensus, a national commitment to civil and political 
rights for all citizens, without regard to race, advanced consist-
ently during the decade of the Civil War. In 1860, there were 
slaves in the nation's capital and the President-elect offered to 
support a constitutional amendment to insulate the institution of 
slavery in the slave states from federal interference. By 1863, 
that same President abolished slavery by executive order in the 
states of the rebellion. Slavery was abolished nationwide in 1865 
by constitutional amendment. Basic civil rights (to make and en-
force contracts, to acquire, hold, and dispose of property, to the 
equal application of criminal laws, and so forth) were extended 
to black citizens by statute in 1866. This equality in civil rights, 
along with equal protection and due process, was constitutional-
ized in 1868. The right to vote without regard to race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude was secured by constitutional 
amendment in 1870. None of this was easy: there was enormous 
resistance in the South, backed by murderous violence, requiring 
repeated, expensive, and unpopular interventions by federal 
22. Ackerman, We the People at 83 (cited in note 1). 
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troops. In 1870, Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts intro-
duced legislation pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment that would have abolished racial discrimination and 
segregation in public schools, cemeteries, railroads and other 
common carriers, and inns and other places of public accommo-
dation licensed in the public interest, and the exclusion of citi-
zens from jury service on the basis of their race.23 This would 
have been the final triumph of Reconstruction. "I will say," 
Sumner said, "that when this bill shall become a law, as I hope it 
will very soon, I know nothing further to be done in the way of 
legislation for the security of rights in this Republic."24 
It was not to be. Already, political leaders with a different 
constitutional vision were signaling their intentions to a public 
weary of the civil rights crusade. Eli Saulsbury of Delaware 
questioned on the floor of the Senate whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment had any "legal or binding force in law," and de-
clared that "I am placed under the most binding obligation to 
maintain for my race that superiority to which it is entitled by the 
decrees of God himself, and here in the council of my country I 
proclaim that no act of mine shall assist to drag it down and place 
it on an equality with an inferior race. "zs William Robbins of 
North Carolina stated that it was "time to recur to the doctrine in 
which is bound up the salvation of this country-the doctrine 
that this is the white man's land and ought to be a white man's 
govemment."26 If anyone doubted that the controversy over 
Sumner's Civil Rights bill was a conflict over the constitutional 
regime, the Democrats' choice of former Confederate Vice Presi-
dent Alexander Stephens as the chief speaker in opposition in 
the House should have made it plain. 
I do not know whether those doing the "signaling" had suffi-
cient support in the populace in 1870 to satisfy Professor Acker-
man's numerical criteria-20% deep support plus 31% mild 
support27-but in light of their later electoral success and eighty 
years of political dominance, it is safe to say they soon got it.ZB 
The first stage of the constitutional moment had been achieved. 
23. Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3434 (May 13, 1870). 
24. Id. 
25. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess., App. 9 (Jan. 30, 1872). 
26. 2 Cong. Rec. 900 (Jan. 24, 1874). 
27. Ackerman, We the People at 274-75 (cited in note 1). This is one of the odder 
features of Ackerman's scheme. Surely, in practice, those proposing change-even the 
New Dealers-must start small and build. 
28. In the 1872 elections, a coalition of Democrats and "Liberal Republicans" cam-
paigned on a platform of restoring "local self-government" to the southern states, while 
the Republicans focused on Ku Klux Klan outrages and the importance of equal rights of 
124 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 11:115 
B. PROPOSAL 
Next came what Ackerman calls a "proposal"-articulation 
of the proposed constitutional change in terms sufficiently spe-
cific for the People to deliberate about it. The immediate focus 
of attention was defeat of Sumner's Civil Rights bill, but the anti-
civil rights agenda went far beyond the defensive objective of de-
feating the initiative of the other side. The Democrats' broader 
objective was to neutralize the Fourteenth Amendment: to re-
store white Democratic government in the southern states and 
with it, a legal subordination of the African race. This was to be 
accomplished without actual repeal of the Amendment, by a 
combination of an exaggerated fidelity to states' rights and a 
disingenuous denial of the social realities of discrimination and 
segregation. These positions were articulated by prominent 
members of the Democratic Party in the Congress and taken to 
the People in the elections of 1874 and 1876. 
To be sure, the elections of 1874 and 1876 were not just 
about the Civil Rights bill-any more than the election of 1936 
was just about laissez-faire. The nation was in the grips of the 
deepest depression in its history (until the Great Depression), 
and the corruption and ineptitude of the Grant administration 
contributed to a nationwide repudiation of the Republican Party. 
But Sumner's proposed Civil Rights bill was the single most con-
tentious issue in 1874, especially in the South. The bill had 
passed the Senate in May but was bottled up in the House. It is 
not too much to say that the election of 1874 was a referendum 
on the nation's continued commitment to civil rights, much as the 
elections of 1934, 1936, and 1938 were referenda on the New 
Deal.z9 
citizenship. The Republicans won 55% of the vote, and swept every state north of the 
Mason-Dixon line, along with half of the southern states. See Eric Foner, Reconstruction: 
America's Unfinished Revolution 1863-1877 509-10 (Harper & Row, 1988) ("Reconstruc-
tion: 1863-1877''). Nonetheless, there was already evidence that the Republicans' com-
mitment to Reconstruction was beginning to be a political liability (id. at 505), and by the 
next election, in 1874, the tide had dramatically turned. 
29. Historians are divided regarding the relative importance of the economic issue 
and the issue of Reconstruction to the election of 1874. William Gillette describes the 
election as "a referendum not only on reconstruction but also on civil rights." William 
Gillette, Retreat from Reconstruction, 1869-1879 256 (LSU Press, 1979). Eric Foner, how-
ever, maintains that "the depression far outweighed Reconstruction as a cause of Repub-
lican defeat." Foner, Reconstruction: 1863-1877 at 524 (cited in note 28). No one doubts 
that both were significant issues, and that both contributed to the Democratic victory. 
See Richard H. Abbott, The Republican Party and the South, 1855-1877 230 (U. of N. 
Carolina Press, 1986) ("The backlash against civil rights, Northern dissatisfaction with the 
Grant administration's policy in dealing with the Panic of 1873, and a growing disillusion-
ment with Reconstruction and Republican regimes in the South allied Northern voters to 
repudiate the Republicans."). 
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C. MoBILIZED DELIBERATION 
As the people began their "mobilized deliberation" in 1874, 
one early outcome was plain: the election of 1874 was one of the 
largest landslides in American political history. The Republicans 
lost 89 seats in the House of Representatives and were reduced 
to only 17 of the 54 House seats in the South. Republicans domi-
nated the House in the Forty-third Congress by a two-thirds mar-
gin; Democrats outnumbered Republicans by 169-109 in the 
Forty-fourth. The magnitude of the electoral verdict equalled, if 
it did not excel, the landslides of the early New Deal. 
The first casualty of the electoral shift was the school deseg-
regation provision of Sumner's Civil Rights bill. On May 22, 
1874, the bill had passed the Senate by a margin of 29 to 16, and 
later came within a hair of garnering the two thirds necessary to 
break the Democrats' filibuster in the House. After the election, 
a lame duck Congress stripped the bill of its most controversial 
features (including school desegregation), watered down its pen-
alty provisions, and passed it over the continuing opposition of 
the Democrats, just one month before the Democratic majority 
would take over. This was to be the last legislative achievement 
of Reconstruction. Moreover, the decline in commitment to civil 
rights was evident in the rhetoric and priorities of the political 
parties. Republicans were increasingly more concerned with eco-
nomic issues. Overt racism reappeared in respectable northern 
political rhetoric, and the call for white supremacy become the 
major theme of Democratic rhetoric in the South.3o People came 
to view the carpetbagger governments of Reconstruction as ut-
terly corrupt and degraded, and linked this corruption to the sup-
posed ignorance and venality of black voters and officeholders.31 
The New England Freedmen's Aid Society disbanded in 1874, 
and the American Missionary Association, formerly in the fore-
front of the movement for black civil rights, declared black suf-
frage a failure.3z 
The Republicans, however, had not given up. To be sure, 
they soft-pedalled the civil rights agenda (much as Alf Landon 
backed away from laissez-faire economics in the campaign of 
1936) and undertook no new civil rights initiatives in Congress. 
But they still held power in a handful of southern states, where 
they continued to enforce the principles of Reconstruction; they 
30. See Foner, Reconstruction: 1863-1877 at 525-26 (cited in note 28). 
31. The first major work along these lines was James S. Pike, The Prostrate State (D. 
Appleton, 1874). 
32. Foner, Reconstruction: 1863-1877 at 527 (cited in note 28). 
126 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 11:115 
still had nominal control of the Senate; and they still had the 
Presidency. As late as 1875 (in Louisiana), the Grant administra-
tion continued to use federal troops to protect fragile Recon-
struction governments from Klan-related violence.33 It would 
take more than a single electoral defeat-however much it might 
be a landslide-to persuade the Republicans to abandon the 
principles on which their party had been founded. Moreover, the 
great civil rights and enforcement acts passed in 1866, 1870, 1871, 
and 1875 were still on the books and could still be enforced in 
courts largely appointed by Republican Presidents. Reconstruc-
tion was not over yet. The Republican Party platform for the 
presidential election of 1876 affirmed that "the complete protec-
tion of all [the] citizens in the free enjoyment of all their rights, 
are duties to which the Republican party is sacredly pledged," 
and declared it to be "the solemn obligation of the legislative and 
executive departments of the government to put into immediate 
and vigorous exercise all their constitutional powers for ... se-
curing to every American citizen complete liberty and exact 
equality in the exercise of all civil, political, and public rights."34 
Although both parties moderated their rhetoric on the civil rights 
issue, there was little doubt about the historic commitments of 
the two sides, and the probable effects of the election. African 
American voters, in particular, are said to have believed that 
with a Democratic victory, "slavery is to be reestablished."3s 
Thus, the clash of views necessary to a constitutional mo-
ment was clearly present. The "reformers" (in this case, the op-
ponents of civil rights) had "gotten together to propose a serious 
transformative initiative," whereupon the "conservatives" {the 
defenders of Reconstruction) "pour[ed] lots of energy into a mo-
bilized defense of the status quo."36 The terminology here is con-
fusing, since those who sought to end Reconstruction claimed 
both the label "reformer" and the label "conservative"-but the 
principle is the same. Together, the reformist movement and the 
"conservative countermobilization" "vastly broaden[ed] and 
deepen[ed] the political engagement of the People on the funda-
33. See Gillette, Retreat from Reconstruction at 122-25 (cited in note 29). Later that 
year, however, the Attorney General declined to send troops to Mississippi, and theRe-
construction government there was overthrown. ld. at 155-58. 
34. Official Proceedings of the National Republican Conventions of 1868, 1872, 1876, 
and 1880 279 (C.W. Johnson, 1903). 
35. Foner, Reconstruction: 1863-1877 at 576 (cited in note 28). 
36. Ackerman, We the People at 286-87 (cited in note 1). 
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mental issues at stake," just as constitutional moment theory 
prescribes.37 
The election of 1876 may have been the most violent, fraud-
ridden, and tumultuous in history; its outcome was surely the 
most uncertain. The Democratic candidate, Samuel Tilden, won 
a substantial majority of the popular vote and carried New York, 
New Jersey, Connecticut, Indiana, and the West Coast states, as 
well as most of the South. The Republican Hayes, however, 
claimed victory by a single electoral vote, based on disputed elec-
toral returns in the last remaining carpetbagger-controlled states 
of South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana. Rival state govern-
ments in these three states sent competing certificates of election 
to Washington. The prevailing view among modern historians is 
that Tilden was entitled (at least) to the Florida electors, and thus 
that he should have prevailed by a vote of 188 to 181.38 But the 
Republicans had a potentially decisive institutional advantage. 
Under the Twelfth Amendment, it is the task of the President of 
the Senate to open the ballots in the presence of both Houses of 
Congress and to count the votes. It is unclear whether this duty 
carries with it the power to determine which ballots to count, or 
whether such a ruling would be subject to an appeal to the floor, 
and if so, on what basis the votes of the senators and representa-
tives would be counted. But Republicans controlled the electoral 
commissions of the disputed states, one House of Congress, and 
the Presidency of the Senate-and they were willing to use them 
to thwart the apparent Tilden victory. This produced a constitu-
tional crisis.39 
Constitutional moment theorists insist that the third phase 
of a constitutional moment must be one of "mobilized delibera-
tion"-not of ordinary politics, where the citizens are content to 
cast their ballots and to leave the government to their elected 
representatives. There "will be a great deal of passion and per-
sonality, action as well as argument, drama as well as debate."4o 
The People will participate: they will engage in marches, rallies, 
and demonstrations, and, although the theorists do not typically 
mention it, there is a hint of violence, of the ultimate Lockean 
37. Id. at 287. 
38. C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction: The Compromise of 1877 and the 
End of Reconstruction 19 (Little, Brown, 1951) ("Reunion"). 
39. For full accounts of these events, see C. Vann Woodward, Reunion (cited in note 
38); Keith I. Polakoff, The Politics of Inertia: The Election of 1876 and the End of Recon-
struction (LSU Press, 1973); Charles Fairman, Five Justices and the Electoral Commission 
of 1877 (Supp. to Vol VII of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise, History of the Supreme 
Court of the United States) (Macmillan, 1988). 
40. Ackerman, We the People at 287 (cited in note 1). 
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"appeal to heaven."41 The first two constitutional moments were 
washed in the blood of Revolution and Civil War, and an under-
tone of New Deal politics was the fear that unless dramatic re-
formist measures were undertaken, America might join Europe 
in the violent descent to the extremes of Right or Left. 
By any of these standards, the events of 1874-77 qualify as a 
period of mobilized deliberation. No one doubted that these 
elections were fought over the future character of the constitu-
tional regime in the southern states. There was no dearth of pas-
sion or of participation. There was violence aplenty. In the tense 
months following the election of 1876, Democratic newspapers 
proclaimed, "Tilden or War" and Democratic governors pre-
pared their militias for armed resistance to a usurpatious Repub-
lican administration.42 According to one participant in the 
events, "it seemed as if the terrors of civil war were again to be 
renewed." He observed that more people expected fighting to 
break out in 1877 than had expected it in 1861.43 And whatever 
one may think of the political morality of the participants, there 
can be no doubt that a substantial portion of the deliberation was 
at the level of principle: the Democrats' attack on centralized 
government and defense of states' rights versus the Republicans' 
waning but still powerful commitment to Reconstruction. 
An initial effort to resolve the electoral crisis through medi-
ation failed. Congress established a 15-member Electoral Com-
mission, composed of five congressional Republicans, five 
congressional Democrats, and five Supreme Court Justices (two 
Republicans and two Democrats, who would then appoint the 
fifth, who turned out to be Republican Joseph Bradley). By a 
series of party line votes, 8-7, the Commission awarded the elec-
tion to Hayes. Not surprisingly, this exercise in partisanship by 
the commission failed to assuage the opposition. 
Attention turned to Congress, where the Democrats held 
control of the House of Representatives and had sufficient votes 
to delay the vote count by filibuster and repeated dilatory mo-
tions. If the votes could not be counted by March 4, Hayes could 
not take office and the country would be thrown into con-
stitutional turmoil. The crisis was averted at the last minute by 
the so-called Compromise of 1877, under which a sufficient 
41. See John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, § 242, in P. Laslett, ed., 
Two Treatises on Government 307, 476-77 (Cambridge U. Press, rev. ed. 1963). 
42. For descriptions of the threats of armed resistance, see Foner, Reconstruction: 
1863-1877 at 576 (cited in note 28); Woodward, Reunion at 7 (cited in note 38). 
43. Allan Nevins, ed., Selected Writings of Hewitt 177-78 (Colum. U. Press, 1937), 
quoted in Woodward, Reunion at 7 (cited in note 38). 
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number of southern Democrats would abandon the filibuster to 
allow Hayes to be elected President, in return for which Hayes 
(through intermediaries) made a number of commitments, the 
most important of which was to remove federal military support 
for the remaining carpetbagger governments and thus to relin-
quish responsibility for the civil and political rights of the freed-
men to the hands of the southern white majority. The 
Republicans also agreed to fund major public works projects in 
the South and to appoint Democrats to federal offices in place of 
the carpetbaggers and scalawags who had previously been the 
backbone of the white Republican Party in the South. The Com-
promise was announced on March 1, 1877, on the floor of the 
House by Democratic representative William Levy of Louisiana: 
The people of Louisiana have solemn, earnest, and, I be-
lieve, truthful assurances from prominent members of the re-
publican party, high in the confidence of Mr. Hayes, that in 
the event of his elevation to the Presidency he will be guided 
by a policy of conciliation toward the Southern States, that he 
will not use the Federal authority or the Army to force upon 
those States governments not of their choice, but in the case of 
these States will leave their own people to settle the matter 
peaceably, of themselves .... Under these circumstances, 
pretermitting, at least at this time, any discussion of the man-
ner and means by which Mr. Hayes may secure the Presi-
dency, ... I shall throw no obstacle, by any action or vote of 
mine in the way of the completion of the electoral count.44 
With the help of southern Democrats, the filibuster was broken 
(to the extreme annoyance of Tilden's northern Democratic sup-
porters) and on March 2 Hayes was declared the winner. In 
April, federal troops were removed from active intervention in 
the governments of Louisiana and South Carolina. The last Re-
construction governments collapsed. 
Historians debate over the extent to which the Compromise 
of 1877 was the product of a specific backroom political deal and 
extent to which it was the culmination of a gradual shift in public 
opinion and the priorities of the Republican Party. But no one 
disputes that a vast and dramatic change occurred between 1874 
and 1877, or that the effect was to nullify the rights won by black 
Americans through the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 
At this point in a constitutional moment, after the mobilized 
deliberation of the People has reached a conclusion, even the de-
fenders of the old regime capitulate and commit themselves to 
44. Cong. Rec., 44th Cong., 2d Sess. 2047 (Mar. 1, 1877). 
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honoring the new constitutional norms.45 Indeed, the true hall-
mark of a constitutional moment is that afterward it becomes un-
thinkable that any serious political figure would set himself in 
opposition to the constitutional settlement. Even those not gen-
uinely convinced will be forced to give lip service to it. This was 
true of the end of Reconstruction. 
The Compromise of 1877 was no mere ceasefire in the parti-
san wars. It was the culmination of a political shift that had al-
ready gained steam from the ouster of Republican governments 
in state after state in the former Confederacy. No longer could 
the Republican post-War political strategy of achieving national 
majorities by carpetbag control of southern states be maintained, 
and political support in the North for civil rights-which was 
never robust-had run its course. Civil rights became a political 
liability. Thus, the Compromise of 1877 marked a fundamental 
reorientation of the Republican Party away from the goals of Re-
construction and toward the goal of economic expansion-a goal 
more effectively pursued in alliance instead of conflict with busi-
ness-oriented whites in the South. The Compromise was only the 
most visible sign of a sea-change in public and professional opin-
ion, as profound as any change in opinion in the New Deal.46 
Thereafter, neither of the great political parties of the Nation re-
tained a commitment to fulfillment of the ideals of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Reconciliation between North and South 
(and with it, more lucrative political activities such as railway 
construction projects) was achieved at the sacrifice of the rights 
of black Americans. In the decades after the Compromise, the 
abandonment of these ideals became ever more extreme. The 
Compromise of 1877 "wrote an end to Reconstruction and recog-
nized a new regime in the South. More profoundly than Consti-
tutional amendments and wordy statutes it shaped the future of 
four million freedmen and their progeny for generations to 
come."47 
It should be noted that, as part of the Compromise, Presi-
dent-elect Hayes received assurances that the Democratic gov-
ernments of the southern states would take upon themselves the 
responsibility to protect the civil rights of their black citizens.48 
These assurances may be dismissed as disingenuous, and proba-
45. Ackerman, We the People at 48-49 (cited in note 1). 
46. C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow 77-78 (Oxford U. Press, 
3rd rev. ed., 1974) ("Strange Career"). 
47. Woodward, Reunion at 4 (cited in note 38). 
48. Id. at 227; Woodward, Strange Career at 54-56 (cited in note 46); Foner, Recon-
struction: 1863-1877 at 580 (cited in note 28); James M. McPherson, Coercion or Concilia-
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bly were; but for a brief time it appeared that they might be ful-
filled, at least in a few places. Wade Hampton, the "Redeemer" 
governor of South Carolina, for example, appointed more black 
officeholders (86) than his carpetbagger predecessors and sought 
to improve education and the justice system for black South 
Carolinians.49 The Compromise can thus be restated in the fol-
lowing terms. The two great constitutional issues of the era were 
the balance of power between the states and the federal govern-
ment and the rights of the recently emancipated black citizens. 
The Compromise of 1877 was a capitulation on the first issue; the 
independence and autonomy of the southern states was restored. 
But it was not a total capitulation on the second: the rights of 
black citizens would continue to receive a promise of protection, 
albeit from state governments rather than the federal govern-
ment. This resolution proved to be unstable, however, as theRe-
deemer governments of aristocratic "Bourbon" Democrats, with 
whom the Compromise of 1877 was struck, were succeeded by 
more populist Democratic governments with a more overtly ra-
cist political program. A recurring truth of constitutional experi-
ence is that institutional structure is a more important 
determinant of the character of a regime than are theoretical 
guarantees of rights. Once power shifted back to the southern 
states and away from Congress, the promises of continued re-
spect for the rights of black Americans quickly proved illusory. 
This probably came as no surprise to anyone. 
The first step was the Democrats' consolidation of power. A 
major element of this part of the program consisted of the contin-
uation of fraud and political violence against black voters-this 
time with no federal troops or threats of prosecutions under the 
Ku Klux Klan Act to restrain them. In the electoral campaigns 
of 1878, scores of African Americans were killed and Republi-
cans were overwhelmingly defeated throughout the South. 
Blacks continued to vote and to hold office in significant but ever 
diminishing numbers for the remainder of the century; but by the 
first decade of the 1900s black disenfranchisement was complete 
and the Fifteenth Amendment was a dead letter in the states of 
the old Confederacy.so 
tion? Abolitionists Debate President Hayes's Southern Policy, 39 New England Q. 474, 
484-85 (1966). 
49. Woodward, Strange Career at 55 (cited in note 46). 
50. /d. at 53-54; Foner, Reconstruction: 1863-1877 at 590-92 (cited in note 28); Eve-
rette Swinney, Enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment, /870-1877, 28 J. Southern Hist. 202 
(1962). 
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Repressive social legislation followed. As C. Vann Wood-
ward has shown in his classic study, The Strange Career of Jim 
Crow, race relations in the twenty years following 1877 were flex-
ible and uncertain.51 Although a combination of custom, legal 
hostility, company regulation, and black poverty led to substan-
tial segregation of common carriers and places of public accom-
modation in many areas,52 there was a surprising degree of both 
de jure and actual desegregation in many southern jurisdictions 
from the early 1870s until 19{)().53 The first major wave of segre-
gation legislation did not occur until the 1880s.54 The first genu-
ine Jim Crow law requiring segregation of all railroad facilities 
was passed by Florida in 1887, followed by Mississippi in 1888 
and Texas in 1889. The Louisiana statute upheld in Plessy v. Fer-
guson was passed in 1890.55 By 1900, a rigid system of legally-
enforced separation and subordination dominated all aspects of 
race relations throughout the South.56 
The Compromise of 1877 marked not just a legal revolution, 
but a social revolution. It transformed the way the people of the 
South conducted their government, exercised their legal rights, 
51. Woodward, Strange Career (cited in note 46). In accord, Foner, Reconstruction: 
1863-1877 at 587-93 (cited in note 28). 
52. Foner, Reconstruction: 1863-1877 at 368, 371-72 (cited in note 28); Charles A. 
Lofgren, The Plessy Case 9-17 (Oxford U. Press, 1987). 
53. See generally Woodward, Strange Career at 31-44 (cited in note 46). See also C. 
Vann Woodward, American Counterpoint: Slavery and Racism in the North-South Dia-
logue 253 (Little, Brown, 1964) ("American Counterpoint") (describing the desegregation 
of transportation in New Orleans, Charleston, Richmond, Savannah, and Louisville). For 
a less rosy picture, see Richard C. Wade, Slavery in the Cities: The South 1820-1860 (Ox-
ford U. Press, 1964) (tracing origins of Jim Crow practices to the cities of the South prior 
to the War); Joel Williamson, After Slavery: The Negro in South Carolina During Recon-
struction, 1861-1877 (U. of N. Carolina Press, 1965) (discussing southern movement to-
ward segregation in the early years after the War); Lofgren, The Plessy Case at 7-27 (cited 
in note 52) (presenting a balanced account of the evidence). Woodward himself acknowl-
edges the historical dispute in Woodward, American Counterpoint at 253 n.53. 
54. For detailed accounts of the emergence of Jim Crow laws in four southern juris-
dictions, see Stanley J. Folmsbee, The Origin of the First "Jim Crow" Laws, 15 J. Southern 
Hist. 235 (1949) (Tennessee); Linda M. Matthews, Keeping Down Jim Crow: The Rail-
roads and the Separate Coach Bills in South Carolina, 73 S. Atl. Q. 117 (1974); Bruce A. 
Glasrud, Jim Craw's Emergence in Texas, 15 Am. Students 47 (1974); August Meier and 
Elliott Rudwick, A Strange Chapter in the Career of "Jim Crow," in August Meier and 
Elliott Rudwick, eds., The Making of Black America: Essays in Negro Life & History, Vol 
11, The Black Community in Modem America 14-19 (Atheneum, 1969). 
55. Lofgren, The Plessy Case at 22 (cited in note 52). 
56. Constitutional moment theorists might object that it took a quarter of a century 
for this "moment" to attain its full form. True enough. But it can equally be said that it 
took 35 years for the welfare-regulatory regime of the New Deal to attain its full form in 
Lyndon Johnson's Great Society. In both cases, the essential outlin~s o~ ~nstitutio~al 
change were laid down in a period of two to four years, and the full1mphcat10ns contm-
ued to be realized for a generation, at the end of which the principles were firmly 
entrenched. 
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and lived their lives. It was accompanied by corroborating ideo-
logical shifts in science, literature, journalism, history, and reli-
gion.s7 Far more than the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Compromise of 1877 created a far-reaching and long-persisting 
constitutional regime: the regime of Jim Crow. 
D. CoDIFICATION 
According to constitutional moment theorists, the final stage 
of a constitutional moment consists of "codification" by the 
courts-when the courts translate the "moment" into formal 
legal doctrine and uphold statutes that would have been invali-
dated under the traditional principles of the preceding regime (or 
strike down statutes that would have been upheld).ss In the case 
of the constitutional moment that ended Reconstruction, the 
"codification" began in 1873 and was complete by 1896.59 
The first, highly ambiguous step came with the Slaughter-
house Cases in 1873. This decision-so difficult to square with 
the language and theory of the Fourteenth Amendment-can be 
seen, in retrospect, as an attempt to assuage the conflict over Re-
construction by prudent compromise, and as foreshadowing the 
Compromise of 1877. Like the Compromise, the Slaughterhouse 
decision attempted to reduce the Amendment's impact on states' 
rights notwithstanding its effects on race. On the one hand, the 
Court refused to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment "radically 
changes the whole theory of the relations of the State and Fed-
eral governments to each other. "60 The decision confined the 
"privileges or immunities of citizens" to rights arising under fed-
eral law. This meant that the essential civil rights of property, 
contract, security of the person, equal application of criminal law, 
and so forth, were left to the vagaries of state law-a great vic-
tory for states' rights. The effect of a contrary interpretation, the 
Court stated, would be to "degrade the State governments by 
subjecting them to the control of Congress, in the exercise of 
powers heretofore universally conceded to them of the most or-
dinary and fundamental character. "6t On the other hand, the 
57. See Woodward, Strange Career at 74 (cited in note 46); Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Social Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985 Duke L.J. 624. 
58. Ackerman, We the People at 289 (cited in note 1). 
59. Indeed, the move may have begun as early as 1872, with Blyew v. United States, 
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1872) (adopting narrow construction of jurisdictional provisions of 
the Civil Rights Acts of 1866). See Robert D. Goldstein, Blyew: Variations on a Jurisdic-
tional Theme, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1989). 
60. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1873). 
61. ld. 
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Court maintained, in dictum, that "the one pervading purpose" 
of the Reconstruction Amendments is "the freedom of the slave 
race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the 
protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the op-
pressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited domin-
ion over him. "62 Thus, the Court accepted the southern, 
Democratic theory of states' rights and the northern, Republican 
theory of equality of rights. 
In a brace of cases in 1876, the Court took major steps to-
ward dismantling the federal power to enforce Reconstruction. 
As noted above, enforcement of the civil rights laws required 
massive federal intervention in the form of military occupation 
and federal prosecution of malefactors. In United States v. 
Reese,63 the Court struck down a federal statute imposing crimi-
nal sanctions on local officials for denial of the right to vote. 
Although the grounds for the decision were technical-the stat-
ute appeared to apply to denials of the right to vote on grounds 
other than race, and thus exceeded the power of Congress under 
Section Two of the Fifteenth Amendment-the reasoning was 
transparently faulty64 and the practical effect was to undo a ma-
jor underpinning of Reconstruction. The supposed defect in the 
statute could be easily remedied, but by 1876 it no longer would 
be-and indeed, in 1894, the statute would be repealed.6s 
United States v. Cruikshank,66 while more defensible as a 
legal matter, was-according to historian Eric Foner-"devastat-
ing" to Reconstruction as a practical matter.67 The case arose 
out of the outrages of the Colfax massacre, the "bloodiest single 
instance of racial carnage in the Reconstruction era. "68 After the 
disputed gubernatorial election of 1872 in Louisiana, blacks in 
the town of Colfax organized themselves for self-defense against 
an expected attempt by white Democrats to seize control over 
the government. On Easter Sunday, 1873, a mob of white citi-
zens armed with rifles and a small cannon overwhelmed the de-
fenders and engaged in a day of indiscriminate killing. Two 
whites and 280 blacks were killed-including fifty black men who 
62. Id. at 71. 
63. 92 u.s. 214 (1876). 
64. As the dissenting opinion showed, the statute, properly read, applied only to 
denials based on race. 92 U.S. at 241-45 (Hunt, J., dissenting). Moreover, since the stat-
ute was constitutional as applied to the defendant, it was a stretch for the Court to invali-
date it in toto. 
65. 28 Stat. 36, 37 (1894). 
66. 92 u.s. 542 (1876). 
67. Foner, Reconstruction: 1863-1877 at 530 (cited in note 28). 
68. ld. at 437. 
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had laid down their arms under a flag of surrender.69 More than 
100 of the alleged perpetrators were indicted in federal court for 
these offenses, pursuant to the Enforcement Act of May 31, 
1870, which prohibited private violence intended to prevent the 
exercise of rights and privileges protected by the Constitution. 
Eight of the defendants went to trial and three were convicted. 
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the convictions and or-
dered the defendants discharged. 
The principal ground of the Cruikshank decision is that key 
counts of the indictment were "too vague and general. "7o This 
reinforced the sense that the courts would bend over backward 
to protect the rights of white southerners opposing Reconstruc-
tion, but the holding was not unreasonable, nor was it necessarily 
a serious obstacle to future prosecutions under more precisely 
drawn indictments. Other sections of the opinion, however, rest 
on the more far-reaching proposition that private persons are 
not-and constitutionally cannot be-liable for violating the 
Fourteenth Amendment rights of other private persons. "The 
fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from denying to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," 
the Court explained, "but this provision does not . . . add any 
thing to the rights which one citizen has under the Constitution 
against another." The "only obligation resting upon the United 
States," it said, "is to see that the States do not deny the right."n 
Thus, the federal government had no power to protect against 
the private violence that was the principal means by which white 
Democrats sought to nullify the protections of the law. This is 
not the occasion for a critique of the legal analysis of Cruik-
shank-suffice it to say that there is a substantial argument that 
Section Five empowers Congress to supply supplementary pro-
tection when a state is unwilling or unable to extend the equal 
protection of the laws to all persons within its jurisdiction-but 
the effect was to undermine the legitimacy of continued federal 
intervention to prevent political violence in the southern states, 
at precisely the time when the Republican Party was finding it 
politically expedient to withdraw from that thankless task.n 
69. ld. 
70. 92 U.S. at 559. 
71. ld. at 554-55. This portion of the opinion did not apply to rights under the Fif-
teenth Amendment. 
72. See Swinney, 28 J. Southern Hist. at 207-09 (cited in note 50). The Cruikshank 
holding was later reinforced by United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883), which held 
that Congress could not make lynching a federal crime, at least in the absence of an 
allegation that the state was derelict in its duty of protection. 
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The path of judicial codification of a new constitutional 
order does not necessarily run straight. In 1880, the Supreme 
Court rendered a series of decisions that kept alive some part of 
the Reconstruction commitment to an equality of rights. In a trio 
of decisions written by Justice Strong over strong dissents by Jus-
tice Field, the Court held that the equal protection clause pro-
tects black defendants against the exclusion of members of their 
race from the petit jury, whether by statute or by executive or 
judicial authority.73 This was hardly adventurous: it simply con-
firmed the congressional determination, as part of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875, that the exclusion of blacks from juries was a 
denial of equal protection to black litigants. But the Court took 
the opportunity to reaffirm in powerful language that the Four-
teenth Amendment "was designed to assure to the colored race 
the enjoyment of all the civil rights that under the law are en-
joyed by white persons, and to give to that race the protection of 
the general government, in that enjoyment, whenever it should 
be denied by the States."74 
The private violence cases and the jury cases might be recon-
ciled as an attempted continuation of the Slaughterhouse com-
promise: the heavy hand of federal military and prosecutorial 
intervention was broken in Reese and Cruikshank, but the essen-
tial protection of trial by impartial jury-a local institution-was 
retained for black individuals. But just as the political assurances 
of the Compromise collapsed within a decade, so the Supreme 
Court's commitment to what it had called "the one pervading 
purpose" of the Reconstruction Amendments seemed to evapo-
rate after 1880. 
The most important step in this development was the Civil 
Rights Cases of 1883.75 There, the Supreme Court invalidated 
even the watered-down version of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 
that had survived the electoral debacle of 1874. This Act, the last 
civil rights statute until after World War 11,76 prohibited discrimi-
nation by common carriers and licensed establishments of public 
For an argument that the Reese and Cruikshank decisions were "based on technicali-
ties" and "still managed to sustain Congress's power to protect directly citizens' funda-
mental civil and political rights," see Michael Les Benedict, Reconstruction and the Waite 
Coun, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 39, 79, 77. 
73. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 
(1880) (dictum); Ex pane Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880). See also Nealv. Delaware, 103 
u.s. 370 (1881). 
74. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306. 
75. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
76. This characterization puts aside a minor voting rights statute passed in 1890, 
which quickly became a dead letter. 
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accommodation. The constitutional theory of the Act's propo-
nents was that the common law of common carriers gave all pa-
trons willing to pay the fare an enforceable legal right to be 
served, without preference or discrimination; and that the failure 
or refusal of a state to recognize racial discrimination as a viola-
tion of this common law right constituted either a denial of the 
privileges and immunities of citizens or (after Slaughterhouse) of 
equal protection of the laws. 
Within eighteen months of passage of the Act, a challenge to 
its constitutionality had reached the Supreme Court, in a case 
involving a Kansas innkeeper who refused to serve a black wo-
man supper at the table of the inn.77 But mysteriously, the Court 
dithered for six years before hearing argument and rendering a 
decision. Historians have suggested no legitimate reason for the 
delay; it might be surmised that the Court was awaiting a sense of 
the mood of the nation, which was obviously undergoing a com-
plete transformation. Whatever the reason for delay, the Court 
held in 1883 that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was unconstitu-
tional because it constituted "direct and primary" legislation of 
private conduct, without reference to whether the state provides 
equal protection of the law.7s The Act "applie[d] equally to cases 
arising in States which have the justest laws respecting the per-
sonal rights of citizens, and whose authorities are ever ready to 
enforce such laws, as to those which arise in States that may have 
violated the prohibition of the amendment," and thus extended 
beyond the power of Congress under Section Five.79 While this 
statement of controlling principle is sound, the decision to invali-
date the entire Act is subject to three quite serious objections. 
First, why does a defendant in a state that has failed to provide 
equal protection of the common law of common carriers have 
standing to object to the potential application of the Act to per-
sons in other states? Second, why does Congress lack the power 
to determine on a nationwide basis that federal law is needed to 
protect constitutional rights that are frequently (even if not uni-
versally) denied? And third, why did the Court not interpret the 
Act narrowly so as to avoid the constitutional difficulty, or re-
form it through the doctrine of severability? 
77. United States v. Murray Stanley, File No. 7914 (filed Oct. 3, 1876). 
78. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20. 
79. Id. at 14. The Court did not hold, as is commonly thought, that Congress lacks 
the power to regulate private action under Section 5. It held only that Congress's power 
to enforce the Amendment takes effect only when the state government fails to extend 
equal protection. 
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Legal propriety aside, the practical effect of the Civil Rights 
Cases, like that of Reese and Cruikshank, was to erase one of the 
principal legislative achievements of the Reconstruction period. 
To be sure, the technical flaws in the Enforcement Act and the 
Civil Rights Act could be remedied easily as a matter of legisla-
tive draftsmanship, but by the time the Court had acted the polit-
ical balance of power had shifted and Congress no longer had an 
interest in protecting civil rights. Moreover, the language of the 
opinion reflected the Justices' "switch in time." Whereas in 
Slaughterhouse the Court had said that the "one pervading pur-
pose" of the Reconstruction Amendments was "the protection of 
the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of 
those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over 
him,"so ten years later Justice Bradley (who had dissented in 
Slaughterhouse and cast the decisive vote for Hayes in the dis-
puted Electoral Commission) would write for the Court: "When 
a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent 
legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that 
state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation 
when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the 
special favorite of the laws. "sl That passage can serve as the 
"codification" of the new constitutional order, the equivalent of 
West Coast Hotel or Jones & Laughlin. 
But this was not all; things would get worse. The capstone of 
Jim Crow constitutionalism was the infamous decision in Plessy 
v. Ferguson, upholding the constitutionality of a Louisiana law 
requiring private railroads to segregate black and white passen-
gers.sz The decision is so familiar to students of constitutional 
law that little description is needed. In textbook constitutional 
moment fashion, the decision upheld a statute that plainly would 
have been "invalidated under the traditional principles of the 
preceding regime."s3 The principles of the preceding regime had 
been clearly enunciated in the Civil Rights Act of 1875, in which 
80. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 71. 
81. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25. 
82. This passes by several less important decisions in which the Court further con· 
firmed the growing racism of Jim Crow constitutionalism. Particularly striking is the pair 
of cases, Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878), and Louisville, N.O. & T. Ry. Co. v. Missis· 
sippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890), in which the Court held that a state could not prohibit segrega· 
tion on the intrastate operations of a steamboat engaged in interstate commerce, but that 
a state could require segregation on the intrastate operations of a railroad engaged in 
interstate commerce. See also Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (upholding state 
statute imposing more severe penalties on interracial than intraracial adultery and 
fornication). 
83. Ackerman, We the People at 289 (cited in note 1). 
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Congress employed its Section Five powers to prohibit segrega-
tion in common carriers. An amendment that would allow sepa-
rate-but-equal facilities was voted down after full and vigorous 
debate.84 Even most opponents of the 1875 Act had conceded 
that a state law compelling racial segregation would be unconsti-
tutional, and vociferously (and accurately) denied that any south-
em state had enacted such iniquitous legislation.ss It was not 
until fifteen years later that Louisiana passed a statute meeting 
this description. By that time, the constitutional moment had oc-
curred and the statute-which went beyond what even die-hard 
southern Democrats had been able to defend in 1875-was 
upheld. 
It is curious, therefore, that constitutional moment theorists 
tend to defend Plessy (on legal, not normative grounds): Acker-
man treats Plessy as a legitimate decision under the constitu-
tional regime of the "middle republic" and claims that Brown v. 
Board of Education is legitimate only (or at least principally) on 
account of the New Deal's transformation of the nation from one 
of limited government into one of activist government.B6 This is 
one of the more bizarre twists in modern constitutional scholar-
ship. According to this theory, a close reading of the opinion 
reveals that Plessy was based on a "rejection of government ac-
tivism." Plessy thus becomes like Lochner, and both can be seen 
as a product of a laissez-faire constitutionalism that did not rec-
ognize the legitimacy of government action to promote social jus-
tice.s7 There is a serious weakness in this reading: at issue in 
Plessy was a statute interfering in the marketplace by forbidding 
a private railroad from seating a private passenger in a railroad 
car acceptable to both. The Civil Rights Cases can be seen as 
resembling Lochner, since the effect of invalidating the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875 was to leave privately owned common carri-
ers free to determine whether or not to engage in racial discrimi-
nation. Plessy cannot. State laws requiring segregation, no less 
84. 3 Cong. Rec. 1010 (Feb. 3, 1875). 
85. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 496 (Jan. 22, 1872) (argument of Sen. 
Thurman); 2 Cong. Rec. 454 (Jan. 7, 1874) (argument of Rep. Atkins); 3 Cong. Rec. 980 
(Feb. 4, 1875) (argument of Rep. Lamar); 3 Cong. Rec. 1864 (Feb. 27, 1875) (argument of 
Sen. Gordon). 
86. See Ackerman, We the People at 142-50 (cited in note 1). 
87. Id. at 147. Ackerman is not alone in this analysis of P/essy. See also Louis 
Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 673, 694-95 (1992); Sunstein, The 
Panial Constitution at 42-45 (cited in note 13). 
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than state laws imposing maximum hours for workers, contra-
dicted free market principles.ss 
It is true that the Plessy Court attempted to cloak its deci-
sion in the language of laissez-faire, but the disingenuity of the 
opinion is transparent. The Court framed the issue in Plessy as 
whether the Fourteenth Amendment would "enforce social 
equality"s9-though the actual question was whether the 
Amendment would tolerate state legislation to enforce social ine-
quality. The Court maintained that "[i]f the two races are to 
meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of natu-
ral affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits and a 
voluntary consent of individuals."90 This diverted attention from 
the fact that Jim Crow laws required segregation and imposed 
criminal penalties upon those who sought to meet together in 
covered institutions by voluntary consent. "Legislation is power-
less," said the Court, "to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish 
distinctions based upon physical differences."91 That is a debata-
ble proposition,92 but it turned the issue on its head. No one in 
Plessy was seeking legislation to "abolish" distinctions; Plessy 
was challenging legislation enforcing racial distinctions imposed 
upon the private market by the state. If we look beyond its rhet-
oric, Plessy was an affirmation of the activist state, no less than 
the New Deal cases-in service of different ends, of course. 
Plessy was neither libertarian nor egalitarian. It marked the ef-
fective repeal of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
MOMENT THEORY 
Constitutional moment theorists conveniently chop Ameri-
can constitutional history into three periods, each inaugurated by 
a "constitutional moment" defined not by significant revisions in 
constitutional text but by a major clash of constitutional ideals, 
followed by mobilized popular deliberation leading to a clear 
conclusion, capitulation of the losers, and judicial codification of 
the result. Thus, the "first republic" is the product of the framing 
88. It is often forgotten that railroads and street car companies opposed the enact-
ment of Jim Crow laws-and were frequently successful in their opposition until the last 
decade of the Nineteenth Century. See Matthews, 73 S. Atl. Q. at 121-27 (cited in note 
54) (describing opposition of railroad and streetcar interests to segregation legislation in 
South Carolina). 
89. 163 U.S. at 544. 
90. ld. at 551. 
91. Id. 
92. See Woodward, Strange Career at 102-09 (cited in note 46). 
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and ratification of the Constitution; the "middle republic" of the 
Reconstruction Amendments and the Civil War; and the "third 
republic" of the New Deal. 
If the theory is taken seriously, however, this neat scheme 
falls apart. By the criteria of the theory there have been at least 
four constitutional moments. The so-called "middle republic" in-
augurated by the Reconstruction Amendments was short-lived. 
It was challenged by the Democratic Party, especially its south-
em wing, contested in key elections in 1874 and 1876 character-
ized by massive popular participation, and brought to an end by 
the Compromise of 1877, which ushered in a constitutional era 
wholly unlike that envisioned by the framers of the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments: Jim Crow. 
Faced with this history, constitutional moment theorists have 
two options. First, they can accept the consequences of the the-
ory: they can recognize the end of Reconstruction as a constitu-
tional moment and agree that judges were obligated to respect it. 
This means, among other things, that Plessy was right and Brown 
was wrong. That may not be a happy result, but any theory of 
constitutional legitimacy based on the will of the People is sub-· 
ject to the risk that the People may go grievously awry. 
Second, they can counter the claim that 1877 marked a con-
stitutional moment by assimilating the constitutional principles 
of the Jim Crow Republic to the preceding period. Under this 
view, the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that pre-
vailed after 1877 did not require a constitutional moment be-
cause it was within the range of legitimate interpretations of the 
Amendment (albeit at the conservative, formalistic end of the 
range). Cruikshank and Reese can be seen as technical and prob-
ably correct, Slaughterhouse as an attempt to maintain traditional 
understandings of federalism, the Civil Rights Cases the same for 
the state action doctrine, and Plessy as based on a formalistic 
view of racial nondiscrimination. Proponents of this view can re-
mind us that the architects of Reconstruction were committed to 
states' rights and that the white people of that day were infected 
with racism, thus making radical interpretations of the Amend-
ment (such as Sumner's) implausible. 
The problem is that this tames Jim Crow at the expense 
of taming Reconstruction as well. If the end of Reconstruction 
was no big deal, this must have been because Reconstruction it-
self was no big deal. This line of reasoning implies that the Four-
teenth Amendment was not intended to wreak any radical 
transformation of the regime but only to institute certain rather 
142 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 11:115 
specific changes in legal practices in the South.93 It was a super-
statute, not a transformative amendment. Alternatively, one 
could argue that the constitutional moment begun in 1866 contin-
ued through 1877, resulting in a set of constitutional amendments 
that, when the smoke had cleared, meant relatively little. This 
means that there were not four constitutional moments, but only 
two: neither Reconstruction nor the end of Reconstruction is en-
titled to the status of a constitutional moment. 
Either way-accept the end of Reconstruction as a constitu-
tional moment or deny Reconstruction as a constitutional mo-
ment-the effect is the same. Plessy was right and Brown was 
wrong. 
One could cure this problem by declaring that the Civil 
Rights Movement of the 1960s was a constitutional moment, as 
well. That is not implausible (it featured relatively concrete 
"proposals," popular mobilization, interbranch conflict (at least 
as long as southerners controlled the House Rules Committee), a 
decisive decision by the People in the landslide of 1964, and judi-
cial codification in such cases as Heart of Atlanta, Katzenbach v. 
Morgan, Jones v. Alfred E. Mayer, Griggs, and Swann), but it 
leaves us with the uncomfortable conclusion that Brown was 
wrongly decided in 1954, and that the authors of the Southern 
Manifesto were right. Under the constitutional moments theory 
the courts have no authority to transform the regime in advance 
of the constitutional moment. One could say that the constitu-
tional moment came in 1947-48, when President Truman made 
the first courageous steps toward desegregating the military, Hu-
bert Humphrey proposed a civil rights plank, the Dixiecrats 
bolted the Party, and Truman was reelected anyway.94 But I fear 
that the criteria for constitutional moments become so malleable 
that almost any significant popular movement addressed to a 
constitutional issue will suffice. Once we recognize five mo-
ments, why not six (adding the so-called "Revolution" of 1800 
precipitated by Jefferson's defeat of Adams), or seven (the rise 
of Jacksonian democracy), or eight (the Progressive era, which 
produced two of the most transformative of all amendments, the 
93. This is the view of some constitutional scholars even apart from the post-Recon-
struction history. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Government By Judiciary (Harv. U. Press, 
1977). My own view is that the political principles of the Reconstruction Amendments 
were simply an extension of the fundamental principles of the Founding, which, because 
of slavery, had never been fully achieved. This means that the Amendments were trans-
formative in practice but restorative in principle. See Michael W. McConnell, The Four-
teenth Amendment: A Second American Revolution or the Logical Culmination of the 
Tradition?, 25 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1159 (1992). 
94. I am grateful to Sanford Levinson for this suggestion. 
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Sixteenth (income tax) and Seventeenth (direct election of Sena-
tors)), or nine (the discovery of substantive due process in the 
1890s), or ten (the replacement of New Deal judicial restraint by 
Warren Court activism), or eleven (its replacement by the Rehn-
quist Court)? This means that constitutional moments are not 
very effective in entrenching their principles. All that is required 
for repeal is another popular movement the other way, just as 
the Civil Rights Movement repealed the Compromise of 1877 
and the Compromise of 1877 nullified the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments. The theory becomes little more than Mr. 
Dooley's pronouncement on the correlation between constitu-
tional judgments and the "iliction returns. "9s 
A final option is to abandon the theory-at least as a theory 
of interpretation. The problem is that the courts cannot know 
whether a constitutional moment has taken place until after they 
have acquiesced in it. If they do not acquiesce, it is not a consti-
tutional moment. If the Court had decided Slaughterhouse, 
Cruikshank, and Plessy the other way, and stuck to its guns, it 
would not have been wrong; its very actions would have been 
proof that the attempted constitutional moment had failed. So, 
too, with the New Deal. If the Old Court had adhered to its 
principles, and if new appointees to the Court had adopted the 
jurisprudential coloration of the old (as Jefferson's appointees 
adopted Marshallian jurisprudence to Jefferson's extreme annoy-
ance), Roosevelt's attempted constitutional moment would have 
failed. And-most importantly-we would have no basis under 
the constitutional moment theory to say that the Court had 
erred. If the function of a theory of interpretation is to enable us 
to evaluate whether decisions, when made, are "right" or 
"wrong," then the theory of constitutional moments is of no use. 
The history recounted here cannot, of course, "disprove" the 
theory of constitutional moments, any more than the histories of 
the Constitution of 1787, Reconstruction, and the New Deal can 
"prove" it-though an understanding of the ramifications of the 
theory may cause some to question its utility. Abandonment 
of the theory would have the very considerable advantage of re-
storing the principle of a written constitution, on which the insti-
tution of judicial review is said to rest,96 to the center of 
constitutional jurisprudence, and of restoring to constitutional 
lawyers and judges a single text on which to base their interpreta-
95. Finley Peter Dunne, The Supreme Court's Decisions, Mr. Dooley's Opinions 26 
(R.H. Russell, 1901). 
96. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
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tions. But it also would reduce the New Deal to the status of a 
mere phase of our political history, to be imitated or rejected as 
future generations see fit. The same would not be true of Recon-
struction. If we are not compelled to respect the outcomes of 
nontextual constitutional moments, the principles embodied in 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments can be said to survive 
even the popular counterrevolution that ushered in Jim Crow. 
